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Abstract 
Restorative justice underlies various legal solutions all over the world. The Polish legislator also made reference to 
restorative justice by including the settlement between the offender and the victim among sentencing directives. 
The objective of this article is to conduct a more detailed examination of this directive in relation to the essence of RJ, and 
then to review and analyse the solutions adopted in Polish criminal law in terms of their usefulness for the 
implementation of the objectives of restorative justice. The text will concentrate on those instruments and penal 
measures which are not designed to be used for repression against the offender and create – at least seemingly – space 
for objectives closer to RJ. The compensatory measures, the probative measures and an active repentance will be taken 
into account. 
The Polish criminal law is consistent with the continental model existing in all Europe. Therefore, conclusions resulting 
from this analysis may provide inspiration also for authors functioning in normative realities other than Polish. 
 
Keywords: Restorative justice; Criminal law; Sentencing directives; Penal measures; Compensation mediation 
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Introduction 
Although restorative justice (further also referred to 
as RJ) has been the subject of numerous publications, both 
Polish and international, the concept continues to be a 
source of inspiration for legislators and legal researchers. 
Perhaps one reason for its vitality is its complex genesis – 
restorative justice derives from the combination of 
theoretical reflections of criminologists and victimologists 
and traditional practices of various communities all over 
the world [1-3]. The fact that the idea of restorative 
justice has become embedded in so many different 
national laws presumably explains why this concept is not 
homogeneous.  
 
While the relationship between restorative justice and 
a reaction to a violation of social principles, or an offence 
and a resultant conflict, is indisputable, both retributivism 
and utilitarianism are questionable [1,4,5]. In lieu of or in 
addition to the penalty imposed by a court on behalf of 
the state, the idea is to bring the "stolen conflict" back to 
its parties and concentrate on eliminating the negative 
consequences of an offence [6,7]. One of the approaches 
to RJ concentrates on a meeting between a victim and 
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offender, developing a common solution and achieving 
reconciliation; whereas another one focuses on victim 
satisfaction and reparation of damage caused by the 
offence, even non-consensually [5]. On the other hand, J. 
Consedine highlights the idea of "common good", which is 
to be achieved by engaging the local community, i.e. 
people directly involved in the conflict, in solving it 
(2004). 
 
However, as rightly observed by P. Zawiejski, the 
essence of restorative justice lies in its humanistic aspect 
– a meeting centred on the conflict or restriction of this 
concept to mere compensation are not legitimate (2016). 
 
In the light of the above observations on the underlying 
principles of restorative justice, the question arises 
whether these principles can be implemented in criminal 
procedure by means of instruments of criminal law. M. 
Płatek distinguishes restorative justice from traditional 
criminal justice in the following manner: "Criminal justice 
does not stand in contradiction to restorative justice; both 
are focused on justice. What sets them apart is their view 
on the essence of crime and essence of the judicature" 
(2005). The questions which need to be addressed are 
whether the author accurately captured the differences 
and whether the differences in such important matters 
fade away in view of the enigmatically defined objective of 
the achievement of justice. 
 
With the maximalist approach, restorative justice 
cannot be reconciled with the current model of criminal 
justice, since it assumes complete reconstruction of not 
just criminal law and procedure, but also social structures. 
On the other hand, representatives of a more moderate 
approach allow for a compromise [3]. Coexistence of state 
judicature and restorative justice institutions was 
anticipated by H. Zehr, one of the "godfathers" of the 
restorative paradigm. His postulates aim to give the 
victim and local community their rightful place in the 
system of responding to crime [8,9]. Attempts to 
"reconcile" the postulates of restorative justice and the 
underlying principles of the continental model of criminal 
law and procedure are made in the legislative works of 
European countries [10]. In line with the spirit of RJ, the 
offender should assume responsibility for the offence 
committed and bear the burden of repairing the harm 
done [11, 9]. While the burden may take the shape known 
to classical criminal law, penalty is not central to 
restorative justice. Moreover, H. Zehr warns against using 
the postulates of restorative justice to justify the 
imposition of penalties that are only seemingly in the 
interest of the victim (1990). 
 
Assuming that what is crucial for restorative justice is 
the meeting between the parties and arriving at a solution 
to the conflict between them, and not solely repairing the 
damage, it becomes clear that this result cannot be 
achieved by way of a court decision [6]. The attachment to 
the state's ius piuniendi prevents the adoption of the 
restorative justice model. Given the above, we must 
subscribe to P. Zawiejski's view that such conclusions do 
not preclude the application of solutions typical of 
restorative justice alongside, or even as part of, criminal 
procedure. The resolution of a conflict between the 
offender and victim and repair of damage can 
theoretically be achieved by way of a verdict of a criminal 
court (2016). The question is whether the institutions 
known to the continental criminal law can aid processes 
typical of restorative justice? 
 
The Polish legislator also made reference to 
restorative justice by including the settlement between 
the offender and victim among sentencing directives. Our 
intention is to conduct a more detailed examination of 
this directive in relation to the essence of RJ, and then to 
review and analyse the solutions adopted in the Polish 
criminal law in terms of their usefulness for the 
implementation of the objectives of restorative justice. 
Article 53 § 3 of the Polish Criminal Code provides that "in 
imposing the penalty, the court shall also take into 
consideration the positive results of the mediation 
between the injured person and the perpetrator, or the 
settlement reached by them in the proceedings before the 
state prosecutor or the court". The mention of mediation 
resulted in the fact that this provision is unequivocally 
linked with restorative justice and interpreted 
accordingly. The norm derived from Article 53 § 3 CC is 
sometimes referred to as the conciliation directive [12]. 
 
A preliminary point to note is that the mediation 
settlement is not the only element allowed for in Article 
53 § 3 CC. Interestingly, it is not even expressly 
mentioned there. The literature on the subject quite 
commonly assumes that what is required for a mediation 
procedure to be considered successful is reaching a 
settlement (and not just its implementation) [13], or even 
achieving "any outcome of mediation that is accepted by 
parties to a conflict, in particular the victim" [14,15]. The 
phrase "the court shall also take into consideration the 
positive results of the mediation" means a contrario that 
the court should not take into account the negative results 
[16,17]. The final part of Article 53 § 3 CC also points to 
settlements reached before a court or state prosecutor, 
but not before a mediator. The eventuality that the parties 
will reach a settlement before the authorities conducting 
proceedings can be interpreted as meaning that a 
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spontaneous settlement between the parties may be 
taken into account, in particular in circumstances where 
organisational considerations make professional 
mediation procedures impossible [18]. Another possible 
interpretation of Article 53 § 3 is that settlements 
between the parties reached with the involvement of the 
local community can be taken into consideration, which 
would be to a large extent in line with the tenets of 
restorative justice. Nevertheless, this is not the practice in 
Poland (Bek 2015). It may be conceded that, for the 
purposes of the conciliation directive, the concept of 
settlement has a slightly broader meaning than the one 
given to it in civil law, and it also encompasses a written 
apology to be accepted by the injured party, but does not 
involve any obligation to redress the damage or provide 
compensation [19]. In fact, the directive expressed in 
Article 53 § 3 CC does not accentuate compensation. 
Instead, it highlights the settlement between the parties, 
which suggests the acceptance by the Polish legislator of 
the primacy of the meeting referred to above. 
 
It also appears important that the court take into 
account the settlement and other positive results of 
mediation. The conciliation directive means that the 
settlement between the injured party and offender is a 
critical factor shaping the operation of criminal law. A 
number of publications rightly emphasise that the court is 
not bound by the contents of the settlement, but it should 
instead attempt to shape its decision in such a manner 
that, if possible, it does not impair the settlement between 
the parties [20,21,13]. It should be also recalled that the 
court must simultaneously meet the requirements of 
other – at least equally important – sentencing directives, 
such as the directive of the degree of the offender's guilt, 
or the directive of the degree of social harm [12]. 
Therefore, even at this stage, it is clear that during 
criminal proceedings the victim and offender are not in 
charge of the conflict between them. The conflict "stolen" 
from them is "loaned" to them for the duration of the 
mediation procedure. However, once mediation is over, 
the fate of both parties (in particular the offender) 
essentially depends on the court. While the parties may 
make themselves mutually bound by the provisions of 
their settlement, yet they cannot bind the court with these 
arrangements. The terms of the settlement become a 
moral and civil obligation for the parties. With several 
exceptions, the settlement, or even reconciliation of the 
parties, redressing all damage, or the overall conflict 
resolution, do not necessarily imply impunity for the 
perpetrator. 
 
The fact that the final decision as to the shape of the 
criminal law reaction is made by the court does not 
exclude the possibility of fulfilling the wishes of the 
parties, as expressed in the settlement, and does not 
prevent the application of the compensatory principles of 
restorative justice. Of all the different solutions and 
measures known to criminal law, those in which 
repressions against the offender are pushed into the 
background and priority is given to avoiding or repairing 
damage caused by the offence merit special attention. 
Compensatory and probative measures offer some space 
for RJ. The institution of active repentance may also be of 
interest in this regard, given that it rewards those 
perpetrators who have "voluntarily prevented damage 
that could result from a prohibited act or eliminated the 
damage already caused". 
 
Compensatory Measures 
Of all the measures that criminal courts have at their 
disposal, particular attention – in the context of 
restorative justice – should be given to compensatory 
measures. They are intended to repair harm and damage, 
thus meeting the requirements of one of the tenets of RJ. 
In general, these are sums of money that a court can 
award, as part of the custodial sentence, in favour of the 
injured party or other entitled persons. It is beyond any 
doubt that such financial burdens imposed on the 
offender, and in particular the compensatory measure 
that consists in the obligation to redress damage (Article 
46 CC), may be a consequence of the commitments made 
in the mediation settlement. What was once a contractual 
obligation has thus become a compensatory measure 
whose implementation is subject to consequences 
characteristic of criminal law. The institution laid down in 
Article 46 CC can be considered a restorative justice tool 
only if it repeats a solution reached by the parties and 
indicated to the court in the motion of the injured person 
or in the mediation settlement. Where the 
aforementioned compensatory measure is applied 
exclusively on the initiative of the court, or where it 
results from the motion of the injured party not preceded 
by a settlement with the offender, it continues to be an 
attempt to ensure compensation for the injured party, but 
loses its relevance to the idea of RJ. In this situation 
compensation is not a result of a meeting between the 
parties and does not have to go hand in hand with the 
conflict resolution.  
 
In its current wording, Article 46 CC explicitly obliges 
the court to use provisions of civil law while imposing the 
obligation to compensate or make amends for the harm 
caused, except for the provisions of civil law on the 
possibility to adjudge an annuity. In addition, pursuant to 
Article 56 CC, this measure became independent of the 
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principles governing the imposition of penalty and other 
means, thus meaning that e.g. the degree of the offender's 
guilt may not result in the compensation being reduced. 
At the same time, Article 56 CC separates the 
compensatory measure from the aforementioned 
conciliation directive derived from Article 53 § 3 CC, 
which may weaken the influence of the settlement 
concerning the obligation under Article 46 CC between 
the victim and offender. From the perspective of 
restorative justice, it would be helpful if the declarations 
made by the parties, included in the settlement and 
directed to the court, were treated as the motion specified 
in Article 46 CC. It appears that the court may and should 
act in response to the motion of the injured party for an 
amount even less than what would otherwise be 
determined based on the extent of damage and harm, 
provided that there are no doubts as to the voluntariness 
of the motion.  
 
A further regulation important from the point of view 
of restorative justice is the possibility to adjudge a 
supplementary payment to the closest relative of a 
deceased victim of a crime (Article 46 § 2 CC). A financial 
settlement between the offender and the victim's family, 
which can serve as an example of the implementation of 
the idea of RJ, may be reflected in the application of the 
compensatory measure. In the light of Polish criminal law, 
there are three issues that may prevent arrangements in 
this regard from being fully taken into account. First, 
pursuant to the amended regulation, courts are now being 
forced to determine whether and, if so, to what extent, the 
life situation of the closest relative has deteriorated as a 
result of the victim's death, which complicates evidentiary 
proceedings. Secondly, the legislator limits the amount of 
the supplementary payment by introduction of a 
maximum amount of PLN 20.000. Thirdly, it appears that 
the aforementioned Article 56 CC obliges the court to 
apply sentencing directives also when adjudging a 
supplementary payment. It only expressly excludes from 
them the obligation to repair the damage done and 
compensate for the harm caused. This exclusion does not 
concern the supplementary payment in whatever form. 
This means that the amount of the supplementary 
payment depends not just on the extent of the damage 
and harm, but also e.g. on the degree of the offender's 
guilt.  
 
The analysis of the possible legal consequences of 
reconciliation between the victim and offender as regards 
compensatory measures must also include the mandatory 
supplementary payment of PLN 10,000 for the person 
injured in one of the offences against safety in traffic, as 
specified in Article 47 CC. The imposition of the 
supplementary payment is mandatory also when the 
offender voluntarily repaired the damage and made 
amends for the harm caused. The court is released from 
the obligation to impose the measure defined in Article 47 
CC on the offender only if instead of it, the court imposes 
an obligation to repair the damage or make amends for 
the harm caused in an amount greater than PLN 10,000. 
The regulation also affords the court the possibility to 
impose a lower supplementary payment e.g. in case of 
reconciliation between the victim and offender, i.e. for 
instance as a result of successful mediation. However, the 
court is in no position to waive entirely the imposition of 
the supplementary payment, which does not correspond 
to the principles of restorative justice, but still fulfils the 
restorative function of criminal law.  
 
Probative Measures 
Under Polish law, measures connected with placing 
the perpetrator on probation may be criminal law's 
reaction to an offence committed by the offender. These 
measures include conditional discontinuance of criminal 
proceedings, conditional suspension of the execution of a 
penalty, and conditional release from serving the 
remaining part of the sentence of deprivation of liberty. 
The common denominator for these institutions is that 
they reduce penal repressions resulting from the crime 
committed [22]. A reduction in repressions is conditional 
in nature, though, in the event where the results of the 
probation are positive, the repressions are remitted for an 
unspecified period of time, whereas the negative results 
imply that the repressions will be applied to their full 
extent. Although some authors maintain that probative 
measures weaken the retaliatory function of criminal law 
[22], this solution may in fact bring numerous advantages. 
Shifting the centre of gravity to the protective function of 
criminal law, with special regard to individual prevention 
necessary to formulate the criminological and social 
prognosis, appears to offer much broader perspectives for 
the use of restorative justice. 
 
Putting the offender on probation, in particular when 
it is accompanied by the simultaneous application of 
semi-custodial elements, is largely disconnected from 
simple repression or re-establishment of justice, since it 
instead concentrates on prescribing the probation period 
in such a manner as to ensure that the offender will abide 
by the law in the future. The normative shape of probative 
measures allows for support and supervision of the 
offender through a probation officer and probationary 
obligations. Assigning these two functions the importance 
they deserve ought to take into account the legitimate 
interests of the victim. Moreover, in some cases, ensuring 
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that the harm caused is redressed is a prerequisite for the 
application of probative measures. In this regard, the 
question arises as to whether the Polish criminal law 
rules governing the placement of the perpetrator on 
probation support the claim that the road to the 
implementation of the postulates of restorative justice is 
open in this area.  
 
A further analysis of this issue must be preceded by a 
review of the various probative measures. This is due to 
the fact that the normative status quo: conditional 
discontinuance of criminal proceedings, conditional 
suspension of the execution of the penalty of deprivation 
of liberty, and conditional early release are not equivalent 
institutions.  
 
In the case of conditional discontinuance of criminal 
proceedings, the imposition of the penalty of deprivation 
of liberty is conditionally suspended, although the 
perpetrator has been found guilty of committing an 
offence [22]. In order for the discontinuance to be applied, 
it is necessary to establish the circumstances regarding 
the attribution of blame to the offender. The offence in 
question must not constitute a considerable violation of 
the legal order – it must not be subject to a penalty 
exceeding 5 years of deprivation of liberty, the 
perpetrator's guilt and social consequences of the act 
committed are not significant, and the circumstances of 
its commission do not raise doubts. In the event that 
criminal proceedings are conditionally discontinued, 
penal repression is mitigated to the greatest possible 
extent: despite the committed offence, the perpetrator 
maintains a clean criminal record. Given that the profits 
are so large, the legislator sets out a strict requirement 
that the perpetrator cannot have any previous convictions 
for an intentional offence.  
 
It should be emphasised that the imposition of 
obligations on the offender is, as a general rule, optional 
with one exception: the obligation to redress the damage. 
The offender shall be required to redress the damage 
done in whole or in part if any damage was done and if so, 
it was not redressed before the court's decision to apply 
conditional discontinuance of the proceedings. As a result, 
it may be deduced that in the case of conditional 
discontinuance of criminal proceedings, the legislator 
created an instrument for solving the conflict between the 
victim and offender. A person who suffered a loss in 
interest protected by criminal law has a better chance of 
compensation since, first of all, the obligation to 
indemnify is imposed ex officio, and secondly, evading an 
obligation may lead to the reinstatement of conditionally 
discontinued proceedings. Given that there are more 
obligations that can be imposed by the court on the 
offender potentially leading to the resolution of the 
conflict caused by the offence, such as apologising to the 
injured person, it may be concluded that the conditional 
discontinuance of criminal proceedings is theoretically 
capable of fulfilling the postulates of restorative justice.  
 
The question is, however, whether the instruments 
laid down for conditional discontinuance and intended to 
respect the interests of victims and their right to have the 
damage caused by the offence redressed are effective, or 
whether they are of a purely formal nature. It appears 
that assuming that the former is the case is likely to draw 
valid objections. First of all, the victim has no real 
influence on the court’s decision on the application of 
conditional discontinuance of criminal proceedings. 
Secondly, Article 67 § 3 CC provides for the obligation to 
redress the damage in whole or in part. Therefore, it is 
important to establish in which situations the court may 
decide to order partial restitution: the offender's difficult 
financial situation, his diminished responsibility, or 
specific circumstances of the commission of the crime. All 
these circumstances concentrate on the offender while 
overlooking the needs and legitimate interest of the 
victim, which is not conducive to conflict resolution. 
Thirdly, the legislator associates the negative outcome of 
probation with evasion of the reparation of damage by the 
offender, and not an actual lack of restitution. In other 
words, the perpetrator intentionally strives to not fulfil 
his obligations [23], although it is possible for him to do 
so. As a result, the potential reinstatement of 
conditionally discontinued proceedings due to e.g. 
evasion of restitution is closely connected with the 
offender and his conduct during the probationary period, 
while the role of the victim is marginalised in this process. 
Therefore, even if the victim negotiates satisfactory terms 
of a settlement before the court's decision to conditionally 
discontinue the proceedings, and the court then 
incorporates these terms into its judgment, the control of 
the probation period will not include an evaluation of the 
performance or failure to perform the terms of the 
settlement.  
 
Conditional suspension of the execution of a penalty 
consists in voluntary resignation from the execution of 
the penalty of deprivation of liberty for the term of 
probation. This means that the repressions imposed will 
not be executed if the term of probation is successfully 
completed. Conditional suspension may be granted to 
persons sentenced to deprivation of liberty for up to a 
year, provided that the perpetrator was not sentenced to 
imprisonment at the time of committing of the offence. Its 
essence lies the conviction that despite not serving the 
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penalty of deprivation of liberty, the offender will in the 
future observe the legal order. If conditional suspension is 
granted, the gains for the perpetrator are quite significant: 
although the offence he committed is in the opinion of the 
court serious enough to pass a sentence of deprivation of 
liberty, the sentenced individual does not in fact have to 
serve it. The conditional permission to remain at liberty, 
in one's family and professional environment, should as a 
rule be conducive to greater restitutive capabilities of the 
perpetrator, in particular with respect to finance. During 
the term of probation (1-3 years), the court may appoint a 
probation officer to assist and control the conduct of the 
offender and may obligate the offender, for example, to 
apologise to the victim, provide support for another 
person, or refrain from contacting the injured person. 
Furthermore, pursuant to Article 72 § 2 CC, the court may 
obligate the perpetrator to pay a consideration or redress 
the damage in whole or in part, unless it has prescribed a 
compensatory measure. Also in this case did the legislator 
provide for institutions that could potentially fulfil the 
postulates of restorative justice. The injured party has no 
influence on the decision to conditionally suspend the 
execution of a penalty. His/her consent or lack thereof, as 
well as any potential arrangements between him/her and 
the offender with respect to ways of remedying the 
damage and compensating the victim for the harm caused 
by the offence, have no binding force on the sentencing 
process, although obviously they may be taken into 
account. Similarly, restitution may concern only part of 
the damage, and decisions in this regard will be 
conditional on reasons attributable solely to the 
sentenced person and will not take into consideration the 
situation of the victim, or the scope of any settlement 
between the victim and offender. On the whole, such a 
form of probation can in no way be regarded as conducive 
to the fulfilment of the postulates of restorative justice.  
 
As regards the last measure, it should be pointed out 
that conditional release makes it possible to release a 
convicted person from serving the penalty of deprivation 
of liberty after he has served a specified part of the 
penalty, which is half in most cases. Furthermore, the 
granting of conditional release is dependent on a 
simultaneous positive criminological and social prognosis. 
In the case of conditional release, the time remaining to 
the completion of the sentence is a probation period 
(usually 2-5 years). Of all the measures discussed thus far, 
conditional release offers the perpetrator a relatively 
minor preferential treatment, as it releases him from 
serving merely the remaining part of the sentence (mostly 
small). On the other hand, it does not formulate any 
special requirements applicable to the offender – formally, 
after serving a specified portion of the penalty, all 
prisoners, including those convicted for the most serious 
crimes and recidivists, become eligible to apply for 
conditional release.  
 
This may be further facilitated by the fact that the 
legislator provided for combining conditional release with 
special rehabilitation measures, facilitating the 
reintegration of the offender into society and allowing for 
the verification of his conduct at liberty. Likewise, as a 
rule, the court may choose to assign a probation officer, 
and may impose the same obligations as those applicable 
to conditional suspension of the execution of penalty. If 
the damage caused by the offence for which the offender 
has been sentenced has not been redressed, the court may 
obligate him to redress it.  
 
Conditional release is adjudicated in enforcement 
proceedings to which the victim is not a party and does 
not even have the possibility to attend the proceedings or 
appeal against the court's decision. This is not conducive 
to giving the victim the importance he or she deserves. 
Establishment of Article 72 § 2 CC as the legal basis for 
adjudication of the obligation to redress damage in the 
case of conditional release means that only partial 
restitution is possible, and again, for reasons attributable 
solely to the sentenced person. Last but not least, 
conditional release may be revoked e.g. if the offender 
evades the obligations imposed on him, meaning that the 
only thing that is examined is the offender's attitude 
towards the offence committed. Consequently, it must be 
stated that the victim is consistently ignored in the case of 
conditional release – he or she has no status whatsoever 
and in essence his/her opinion does not matter, therefore 
the postulates put forward by proponents of restorative 
justice cannot be fulfilled. 
 
In view of the above, it may be assumed that the Polish 
probation system is not fully conducive to the 
implementation of the principles of restorative justice. 
Obviously there are some elements that contribute to 
conflict resolution and they deserve recognition: the 
mitigation of penal repression, as offered by probation, 
may motivate the offender to make concessions in the 
settlement agreement, and the fact that this mitigation is 
conditional in nature will motivate him to abide by the 
terms of the settlement. The flexibility of restrictions that 
may be imposed during the period of probation, including 
the absence of a closed catalogue of probative obligations, 
allows for inclusion in the sentence of virtually any 
conditions of the settlement agreed by the parties. 
Moreover, placing the perpetrator on probation is a 
safeguard for the victim in that the court controls the 
provisions of the settlement and their future 
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implementation. As regards the restitution, it is of 
fundamental importance for probation and, as such, 
should lie at the heart of the court's concerns. The 
obligation to redress damage ought to determine the 
shape of probation, since the perpetrator's attitude 
towards the damage that he caused and its repair has a 
significant prognostic meaning [24]. What constitutes an 
advantage of probation with regard to RJ may also be its 
disadvantage. Conditional mitigation of penal repression 
is always optional, thus the court may respect the 
settlement between the parties, yet it is not bound to do 
so. Linking the release from detention with a period of 
probation postpones the moment when the repression 
imposed on the perpetrator as a result of the committed 
offence receives its final shape. While two of the three 
measures are adjudicated in the fact-finding proceedings, 
the third one, namely probation assessment, is conducted 
in the enforcement proceedings. However, alteration of 
the stage of proceedings is of fundamental importance for 
this issue. Both fact-finding proceedings and enforcement 
proceedings are intended to fight crime and, while it is 
fair to say that there is a shared unity of the purpose of 
penalty adjudication and enforcement, measures applied 
to pursue this purpose differ depending on the phase of 
the criminal proceedings [25]. Fulfilment of the postulates 
of restorative justice in enforcement proceedings is 
difficult in that the objective of this stage of proceedings is 
to enforce penalties, punishments and other penal 
measures, as may be provided for in the sentence. At this 
stage of the proceedings, the focus is on the convicted 
person, while the victim recedes into the background. The 
underlying idea is to enforce penalty in such a manner 
that the offender does not reoffend, which is in the 
interest not only of the offender, but also of society as a 
whole. As a result of a departure from objectivisation of 
restorative justice and shifting the emphasis to the 
mechanism of individualisation [24], the crime committed 
(and, as a result, the victim) must be pushed into the 
background. Even if the victim is satisfied with the terms 
of the settlement that were transferred into the wording 
of the sentence, not paying regard to the victim in the 
process of controlling the execution of the settlement may 
in fact revive or even intensify the conflict caused by the 
offence.  
 
Active Repentance 
The so-called active repentance is an institution of 
Polish substantive criminal law that affords special 
protection to the interests of the injured party. 
Regulations of this kind are not present in Anglo-Saxon 
law, but can be encountered in most continental Europe 
countries.  
Taking into account the conditions and penal 
consequences, two main models of active repentance may 
be identified: active repentance expressed by the offender 
prior to the commission of a crime (i.e. at the stage of 
punishable preparation or intent to commit an offence), 
and active repentance expressed following the 
commission of a crime.  
 
In order to address the question whether provisions of 
the law that directly or indirectly concern active 
repentance can fulfil the postulates of restorative justice, 
it is necessary to provide a brief overview of these 
institutions, with special emphasis on their mechanism. 
 
Active repentance, expressed both at the stage of 
preparation of a crime or attempt to commit a crime, is 
characterised by the same constitutive elements:  
 
 Conduct different than (opposite to) punishable 
conduct – the perpetrator must desist from action or 
prevent damage/harm,  
 The intended prohibited act was not committed,  
 Voluntariness of conduct of the perpetrator.  
 
A proper assessment of the potential role of active 
repentance in the restorative justice model requires an 
analysis of the consequences thereof, and in particular of 
the mechanism behind these consequences. Under 
provisions of Polish law (Articles 15 § 1, 17 § 1 and 22 § 1 
CC), otherwise punishable preparation of an offence and 
an attempt to commit it are not subject to punishment if 
the perpetrator has expressed active repentance. This 
absence of punishment is not conditional on the wishes of 
the injured party, his or her position, or whether or not he 
or she has forgiven the offender. Impunity is guaranteed 
even in circumstances where the injured party suffers 
negative consequences of the act (although the offender 
did not commit the act he originally intended to commit), 
provided that these consequences do not have the 
qualities of another prohibited act. This means that the 
fear, pain, and loss of confidence and trust on the part of 
the victim are not the subject of a separate penal 
assessment in case of effective regret.  
 
Unconditional impunity in case of the typical model of 
active repentance means that once it has been 
acknowledged, no criminal proceedings shall be initiated, 
and were they to be initiated earlier, and then they shall 
be discontinued (Article 17 point 4 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure). The prosecution service of court is only 
entitled to examine whether the conditions for impunity 
have indeed been met, i.e. whether the fact that an offence 
was not committed resulted from a decision taken 
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(voluntarily) by the offender. The legal consequence of 
active repentance expressed prior to the commission of 
an offence is complete removal of criminal liability.  
 
At this point, consideration should therefore be given 
to the functions attributed to active repentance with the 
aim of contrasting them with the functions of restorative 
justice. As indicated in the literature, active repentance 
performs the following functions: retaliatory, preventive, 
educational, and compensatory. Furthermore, it should be 
stressed that active repentance is intended to protect the 
interests of the injured party, although the Polish penal 
law in fact provides information only on the advantages 
for the offender. 
 
From the perspective of restorative justice, the 
evaluation of active repentance expressed at the stage of 
preparation or attempt to commit a crime leads to several 
important conclusions.  
 
 Active repentance does, without a doubt, implement 
one of the underlying ideas of restorative justice – 
reparation, redressing of damage [26]. 
 Active repentance is intended to provide additional 
protection of the interests of the injured party. 
However, expression of active repentance by the 
offender benefits not only the victim and the offender 
who gains impunity, but also society and the judiciary.  
 Active repentance does not offer the victim anything 
beyond the prevention of damage in the narrow sense 
and potential redressing of damage in broad terms 
(should social unrest caused by the attempt to commit 
a crime be deemed as damage). The victim does not 
have the opportunity to express – as part of the 
ongoing proceedings – his or her emotions generated 
by victimisation, or to listen to the offender in an 
attempt to analyse why the injured party fell victim to 
the crime. Moreover, the victim does not have the 
opportunity to forgive the offender.  
 Active repentance expressed by the offender does not 
necessarily mean that the offender feels remorse, 
assumes responsibility, and admits wrongdoing. While 
this motivation may indeed trigger active repentance, 
this is not necessarily always the case, and Polish law 
does not require that. It is essential to note that the 
positive attitude of the offender does not guarantee 
that he will certainly gain forgiveness from the victim. 
The offender "only" gains impunity, but there is no 
room for the emotional experiences that could affect 
his further life.  
 While the penal consequences of active repentance 
expressed prior to the commission of a crime resolve 
the legal (and only legal) dispute, they in fact prevent 
the resolution of a potential conflict as part of an 
official procedure.  
 
The second type of active repentance refers to the 
offender's conduct post-crime that is intended to 
eliminate damage or prevent it and which entails certain 
consequences that, as provided for by the legislator either 
mitigates or eliminates criminal liability. Referred to as 
the so-called post-crime active repentance, this type of 
repentance is not general in nature – the legislator has 
provided for profits accruing from the expression of 
active repentance in several cases (in particular offences 
against property, economic and financial offences, 
offences against safety). Offenders who committed other 
types of offences and prevented the infringement of 
interest or redress the damage caused shall be liable 
under the general rules laid down in the Code, pursuant to 
which in imposing the penalty, the court shall take into 
account the offender's conduct following the commission 
of the crime (Article 53 § 2 CC). The court may also apply 
extraordinary mitigation of the penalty when the damage 
incurred has been repaired (Article 60 § 2 point 1).  
 
This type of active repentance takes two main forms: 
The "classic" forms of post-crime active repentance 
consist in repairing the damage. This form predominantly 
serves a compensatory, and more generally, restitutive 
function. The underlying principle in this case is that the 
offender is granted certain rights only after meeting the 
conditions for redressing the damage caused or otherwise 
making restitution. Therefore, active repentance 
expressed after the infringement of interest is focused on 
the victim, but not through the protection of his or her 
interests, but through their restitution. Its penal 
consequences usually take the form of optional 
extraordinary mitigation of the penalty. It appears that 
this form of active repentance seems highly likely to 
perform an educational function – it may shape the moral 
behaviour of the offender.  
 
On the other hand, post-crime active repentance intended 
to "prevent damage" plays an important preventive role. 
The legislator renounces its ius puniendi (which in 
practice means impunity) even if the offender has already 
committed a prohibited act, as long as the offender 
prevented the infringement of interest. This type of active 
repentance applies to a special type of offences – when 
conduct that does not infringe specific interest is subject 
to penalty. Therefore also in this case (as in the case of 
active repentance expressed at the stage of preparation or 
attempt to commit an offence) active repentance may 
sometimes help to minimise primary victimisation, 
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prevent material damage, or minimise fear caused by the 
commission of an offence, and thus prevent the creation 
of a conflict or significantly reduce it. 
 
The analysis carried out above allows the conclusion 
that active repentance expressed post-crime and 
preventing damage cannot be treated as an element of 
restorative justice. The reasons for this are the same as 
those for active repentance expressed prior to the 
commission of an offence. In short, unconditional 
impunity leaves no room for a resolution of the conflict 
between the offender and the victim and community. The 
same applies to active repentance expressed post-crime 
and post-infringement of interest intended to prevent the 
infringement of other interest (e.g. voluntary release of a 
hostage). Again, the special preventive character of this 
solution calls for the omission of the postulates of 
restorative justice. Nevertheless, from the perspective of 
the injured party and society as a whole, this is ultimately 
a good solution, as effective prevention is better than 
compensation. 
 
While it is undeniable that active repentance 
expressed post-crime and intended to redress damage is 
strongly compensatory in nature, it does not 
automatically follow that it fulfils the postulates of 
restorative justice. Several points should be raised in this 
regard. 
 
Also in the case of this form of active repentance, the 
voluntariness that is required by Polish law does not 
mean the de lege lata morally positive attitude, meaning 
consequently that Polish law does not require a 
conciliatory attitude to accompany active repentance. At 
the same time, it should be pointed out that the additional 
conditions, as may sometimes be required, to be met by 
the offender to be eligible for a penalty mitigation or 
elimination (denunciation) do not overshadow the 
restorative model, although they do raise some ethical 
and moral doubts. On the other hand, the statutory terms 
for active repentance – e.g. information reaching law 
enforcement authorities, institution of proceedings, 
rendering of a judgment – may unlawfully prevent the 
restorative process. More importantly, however, 
satisfaction of the expectations of the injured party is of 
no legal significance in either form of active repentance 
expressed following the infringement of interest.  
 
It should also be stressed that the mitigation of 
punishment, wherever it is optional, provides a real 
opportunity for eliminating the conflict (since there are 
no formal obstacles to conducting criminal proceedings 
and thus e.g. mediation) and satisfying the needs of the 
injured party and the offender. However, this opportunity 
does not follow from the essence of restorative justice; 
instead, it merely permits the conclusion that its overall 
penal consequences do not thwart this process.  
 
On the whole, it should be repeated that from the 
perspective of restorative justice, active repentance 
expressed prior to the commission of a crime and active 
repentance expressed post-crime but before the 
infringement of interest – as functionally identical – 
constitute forgiveness by the state, without checking 
whether the injured party is satisfied and whether the 
conflict has been resolved. This means that while the 
institution of active repentance is of great significance for 
the injured party, de lege lata it cannot be considered an 
element of restorative justice.  
 
It cannot be denied that active repentance expressed 
post-crime and after the damage has been caused 
corresponds more closely de lege lata to the concept of 
restorative justice. Moreover, post-crime active 
repentance that opens (and not closes) the process of 
conflict resolution would make the Polish criminal law 
system less conducive to denying the offence and would 
increase the probability that the parties interact in a civil 
manner or restore their previous relations (in line with 
the principle "penalty is the enemy of truth"). From the 
perspective of restorative justice, the de lege lata strength 
of this type of active repentance is that it does not exclude 
it – it provides a chance for the elimination of conflict. 
 
Conclusions 
The overall assessment of the provisions of the Polish 
substantive criminal law from the perspective of 
restorative justice makes it necessary to acknowledge 
that it is not a model which promotes the ideas of 
alternative conflict resolution. It appears that the Polish 
legislator has gradually introduced into the criminal law 
system a number of institutions focused on the injured 
party, or even made direct reference go one of the tools of 
RJ – mediation and settlement between the victim and 
offender, without duly taking into account the 
remodelling of the criminal law system towards 
restoration. Given that the objective is to resolve conflict, 
the main observation is that all these measures are rather 
illusory. In most cases, they fulfil only selected postulates 
of RJ – e.g. encourage the redressing of damage, without 
actually requiring any dialogue between the parties, or 
establish a mechanism for the assessment of the 
performance of the settlement based entirely on the 
situation of the offender. In our view, the Polish criminal 
law falls short of the standards established by RJ. In this 
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context, it must be remembered that one of the recent 
amendments of the CC abrogated a provision (adopted 
quite recently) whose objective was to take into account 
in greater detail the conciliatory attitude of the parties, in 
particular of the offender. In essence, the repealed 
provision of Article 59a CC required the court of 
prosecution service to unconditionally discontinue 
proceedings in cases involving minor offences upon a 
motion from the injured party, subject to the condition 
that before the trial proceedings have been declared 
opened by a court of first instance, the offender, who was 
not previously penalised for an intentional offence 
committed with the use of violence, had reconciled with 
the victim, e.g. through mediation, and redressed the 
damage caused or compensated for the harm incurred. 
This provision was awaited by prosecutors, judges, and 
mediators alike. However, it was particularly important 
for the parties who were thus able to "reclaim" the 
conflict that had been stolen from them and could 
relatively freely manage the criminal proceedings. 
Nevertheless, it must be recognised that the changes that 
have recently been taking place in Poland are not 
conducive to conciliatory attitudes, and the reverse is in 
fact the case – strict and repressive criminal law is likely 
to be restored.  
 
In the light of the above, the question is whether 
criminal law instruments can implement the idea of 
restorative justice. It appears that the "classical" criminal 
law is difficult to transform into the restorative model, as 
it then loses a number of its characteristic features 
applied for the purposes of performing its basic functions 
(retaliatory, rehabilitative, deterring). While conflict 
resolution is a priority, it may in fact be legitimate for 
restorative justice to function not so much as part of 
criminal law in the broad sense, but beside it. Such a 
system would therefore make it possible to retain the best 
features of each model, and depending on the situation – 
pursue specific goals. 
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